



At a global scale, the role of strengthening IP institutions in attracting or discouraging foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is ground-breaking. Recent empirical studies have provided evidence 
on the effect of IP institutions on inward FDI from multiple countries or on the effect of IP 
institutions on the outward FDI levels originating from one country. Despite the emerging 
evidence, there is still increasing concern by European policymakers on the access that Chinese 
companies gain on Europe’s key technologies and sensitive infrastructure. It seems that the 
Chinese OFDI has not been greeted with enthusiasm but with a great deal of concern (Knoerich 
and Vitting, 2018). Taking stock of the scant research evidence on the impact of European IP 
institutions on Chinese OFDI we contribute to the literature by providing insightful results 
using a novel estimation methodology, namely the quantile panel regression.  
European Intellectual Property Institutions and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
1. Introduction
According to Dunning (1993), the key motivations for outward FDI are market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking (cost reduction), and resource-seeking, including both natural resource-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking. These are directly linked to the interaction between three 
key sources of competitive advantage, namely ownership-specific, location-specific and 
internalization-specific effects, the so-called O-L-I paradigm (Dunning, 2006). These three 
components are embedded within institutions and are inextricably linked to the “cognition, 
motivations and behaviour of MNEs” (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 580).
In this context, Chinese firms’ decisions to invest in Europe should be motivated by those 
features currently dominating the global economic landscape. As Buckley et al. (2008) posit, 
key features such as tariff barriers, supply-chain bottlenecks, or limited growth opportunities 
and intensified competition in the home market, are contemplated by Chinese investors when 




targeting the EU market. For example, the wholesale and retail trade services and transport, 
storage and postal services are few of the most attractive sectors (MOFCOM, 2013) where 
potential growing demand in the EU region might indeed attract Chinese investment. Given 
that China is a relatively low-cost labour economy one might assume that efficiency is not a 
typical incentive for Chinese investors (Buckley et al., 2007; Chou et al., 2011). Nevertheless, 
there is evidence suggesting that in some instances Chinese investors might target other low-
cost labour countries (Clegg and Voss, 2011). Over the recent years, Chinese firms focus on 
regions rich in natural endowments such as the EU mining industry (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Kolstad  and  Wiig,  2012;  MOFCOM,  2013).  Recently,  emerging  evidence  suggests  that 
technologies, brand names and distribution channels have been instrumental in shaping new 
patterns of strategic behaviour for many Chinese investors through mergers and acquisitions 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rugman and Li, 2007; Cui and Jiang, 2010). 
Additional evidence suggests that, in the short run, profit maximization is far from being a 
primary objective associated with Chinese OFDI as Chinese investors have been establishing 
research and development centres in Europe as a means of upgrading knowledge-intensive 
product manufacturing in China (Bonaglia et al., 2007; Minin et al., 2012). This provides 
support to the view that unconventional patterns of internationalization have been exhibited by 
Chinese firms investing overseas (Mathews, 2002; Sanfilippo, 2015). 
In so far as OFDI motivation and institutional effects relating to each O-L-I dimension is 
concerned, evidence suggests that Chinese firms gain ownership-specific advantages from 
home institutions (Sun et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012), networking with government 
institutions (Yiu et al., 2007) or operating within business groups that are supported by 
governments (Pangarkar and Wu, 2012). Location choices in foreign markets are also affected 
by institutional elements such as cultural proximity or governance structure (e.g., Buckley et 
al., 2007; Shieh and Wu, 2012). In particular, Chinese firms potentially gain internalization-




specific advantages through the selection of governance structures that are congenial to them 
such as wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions (Cui and Jiang, 
2009; e.g., Rui and Yip, 2008; Sun et al., 2012; Zhang, et al., 2011).
Currently, the empirical evidence on the relationship between the strength of IP institutions 
of European countries on Chinese OFDI is scarce. Indicatively, only the studies by Boisot 
(2004), Nolan (2001) and Rui and Yip (2008) discuss the effects of the home IP institution on 
Chinese OFDI whilst Wei et al. (2014), by exploring the effect of the home IP institution as a 
means of enhancing China’s OFDI, find a positive effect. Additionally, Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2019) following a dynamic panel data analysis, established that the strength of IP institutions 
positively affects OFDI from China whilst weak evidence of a potential U-shaped relationship 
was produced. The related literature concedes that institutional factors can potentially motivate 
Chinese firms to invest abroad (e.g., Hoskisson et al. 2013; Liang et al. 2012; Peng et al. 2008; 
Rui and Yip 2008; Witt and Lewin 2007; Deng 2013). Whilst there is some evidence that 
explores the impact of historically weak protection of Chinese IP at home (Boisot 2004; Wei 
et al. 2014) (Globerman and Shapiro 2009; Klossek et al. 2012), the potential effects of the IP 
institutions of host countries on Chinese OFDI have so far not been empirically tested. 
In addition, empirical studies based on country-level data (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad 
and Wiig 2012; Cheung and Qian 2009) have predominately focused on Chinese OFDI directed 
to the global market without exploring regional-specific effects. Among the few exceptions are 
the studies of Kang and Jiang (2012) and Cheung et al. (2012) which focus on Asia and Africa 
respectively. According to Buckley et al. (2008), Chinese outward investors to the EU markets 
face institutional challenges that relate to institutional and economic conditions that EU 
countries experience as well as to the inherent difficulties when engaging in separate 
negotiations with investment agencies at both national and regional level. 




This paper contributes to the literature pertaining to the impact of the strength of European 
IP institutions on Chinese OFDI. We model the drivers of China’s OFDI in relation to the 
European IP institutions, using the quantile panel regression that assumes a non-parametric 
form for the conditional distribution of OFDI, hence, providing information that would not be 
obtained directly from standard regression methods. In other words, such an empirical 
treatment provides us with a more insightful way of measuring the regression relationship at 
several points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable simultaneously. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 elaborates on the theoretical framework 
pertaining the effect of the strength of European IP institutions in attracting or discouraging 
Chinese OFDI whilst section 3 presents the data and the methodology adopted. Section 4 
discusses the results and section 5 provides concluding remarks and policy implications.
2. Theoretical considerations
In an endeavour to provide a comprehensive and insightful definition of institutions, North 
(1990) likens institutions to human and social constructs that condition both human and 
organizational behaviour through a set of rules, procedures, powers of enforcement and norms 
of behaviour. In the same spirit, Scott (1995) draws parallels between institutions – such as 
governments, courts and firms - and a set of structures - such as laws and regulations - that 
promote a stable and a transparent environment within which agents’ activities take place (Orr 
and Scott, 2008). By making a distinction between normative and cognitive structures, Scott 
(1995) purports to link normative structures to the tacit elements established and integrated 
within an institution, and the cognitive structure to the broader values that society is exposed 
to such as cultural aspects that consist of perceptions and explanations of social reality 
perceived by the agents operating within the institution. In view of the above, it becomes 




apparent that the effectiveness of the enforcement of regulations is directly related to the 
perception of both normative and cognitive structures.
The extent to which the strength of the regulatory structure of the IP institutions of 
different countries is effectively enforced by the normative and cognitive structures of their 
institutions varies. Institutional distance between two countries is determined by the degree of 
similarity or difference between their institutions (Kostova, 1996; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
Institutional differences affect international business activity, especially when the distance is 
high, such as for investments between industrialised and less industrialised economies (where 
distance is commonly expected to be high). As Xu and Shenkar (2002: 614) highlight, “from 
an institutional perspective firms will refrain from investing in markets that are institutionally 
distant, because business activities in those markets require conformity to institutional rules 
and norms that conflict with those of the home country”. This is because firms seeking to 
appropriate value from their assets in a foreign market need to ensure that they comply (both 
internally and externally) with the rules and norms instigated by host country institutions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Similarly, for multinational enterprises (MNEs) originating 
from countries with strong institutions, the well-functioning of host country institutions is 
generally expected to have a positive influence on their location selection, mode of entry and 
technology transfer strategies (Dunning, 2006; Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008; Meyer and 
Hung Vo, 2005).
The level of the overall strength of IP institutions is significantly and distinctively 
different between countries worldwide (Kanwar and Evenson, 2009; Park, 2008; USTR, 
2014). After the signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
agreement in 1994, developed and developing countries followed a linear strengthening policy 
trajectory by reforming their IP regulatory frameworks (Taubman, Wager, and Watal, 2012). 




The aim was to create IP institutions that offer stronger levels of IP regulatory protection and 
thereby achieve relative harmonization with the IP institutions of other countries (Grossman 
and Lai, 2004). Although the TRIPs agreement set up minimum regulatory levels that the 
member countries are obliged to comply, it did not specify maximum standards of regulatory 
protection or reform obligations for the actual enforcement aspect of the IP institution 
(Taubman et al., 2012).  
IP institutions and FDI
The impact of strengthening IP institutions on FDI has recently started receiving additional 
currency, stimulating several empirical studies that have reported evidence on the effect of IP 
institutions on either inward FDI or outward FDI originating from one country. This evidence 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between strong IP institutions and FDI flows 
particularly in developing countries (e.g., Alexiou et al., 2016; Adams, 2010; Nicholson, 2007; 
Seyoum, 2006; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). On the effects of the regulatory structure of host 
IP institutions on inward FDI, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) established a highly significant 
positive relationship. The same positive and significant relationship was also confirmed when 
a variable that captures the strengthening of the enforcement-related aspects of host IP 
institutions of transition economies was factored into the specification of the estimation model. 
Khoury and Peng (2011), however, in a study of 18 Latin American economies found that IP 
regulatory reforms adversely affect inward FDI flows whilst a positive effect on inward FDI is 
observed for the early IP reforming countries, in particular, those countrie  with an already 
developed innovation base. 
A similar positive effect on inward FDI is also identified in the results of studies that focus 
on the strengthening of the regulatory structure of the IP institution in single country studies 
(Awokuse and Yin, 2010; Du et al., 2008; Seyoum, 2006). For example, Awokuse and Yin 




(2010) studied the regulatory strengthening of the Chinese IP institution and found that stronger 
IP  regulations  and  the  rise  in  foreign  patent  applications  in  the  early  1990s  had  a  highly 
significant and positive effect in attracting FDI from 38 countries to China. This effect was 
significant  for  inward  FDI  from  all  countries  independent  from  their  level  of  income  or 
development. This evidence was also confirmed by Du et al. (2008) who used a proxy for the 
strengthening  of  the  Chinese  IP  institution  based  on  the  per  capita  absolute  numbers  of 
approved patents in different Chinese regions over the years 1993-2001 and found a positive 
effect in attracting FDI from the US. Finally, Kondo (1995) finds no significant relationship 
between stronger IP levels and inward FDI. 
As far as the impact of stronger IP institutions on outward FDI is concerned, the extant 
empirical literature suggests that countries with strong IP institutions appear to attract higher 
OFDI levels (Bascavusoglu and Zuniga, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2007; Lee and Mansfield, 
1996; Ushijima, 2013). In particular, the strengthening of the regulatory framework of IP 
institutions is associated with a positive impact of OFDI (Branstetter et al., 2007; Lee and 
Mansfield, 1996). In this context, Branstetter et al. (2007) find that patent regulatory reforms 
in patent-intensive industries, over the period 1989-1999, have a significant positive impact on 
US OFDI. Similar results were also obtained by Lee and Mansfield (1996)) whilst for Canals 
Further evidence on the positive effect of the regulative structures of IP institutions on 
OFDI was also produced in additional studies by (Bascavusoglu and Zuniga, 2002; Etienne 
and Bruno, 2005; Ushijima, 2013), whilst the evidence generated by Etienne and Bruno (2005) 
suggests that strengthening IP levels have no significant effect on the OFDI levels. More 
specifically, the strengthening of IP legislation is found to have a negative effect on French 
and Şener (2014) the impact is only evident in the high-tech sector. 




OFDI in the context of those countries that boast a large market as well as those that are 
characterized by relatively low levels of RandD intensity (Etienne and Bruno, 2005). 
In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that motivations of Chinese firms’ investments in 
the EU market share some similar features to those demonstrated in the global market. Chinese 
investors may defensively target the EU market due to tariff barriers, supply-chain bottlenecks, 
or limited growth opportunities and intensified competition in the home market (Buckley et al., 
2008). They may also offensively target EU countries for their scale of potential demand. 
Seeking efficiency is not a typical incentive given that China still provides cheap factors of 
production (Buckley et al., 2007; Chou, Chen, and Mai, 2011). Nevertheless, some Chinese 
investors actively target countries such as Romania specifically because of their relatively low 
labour costs (Clegg and Voss, 2011). Chinese firms specifically target regions rich in natural 
endowments (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012). For example, the EU mining 
industry is one of the top five most invested industries by Chinese OFDI (MOFCOM, 2013)1. 
In addition, recent research indicates that Chinese firms are determined to access and acquire 
strategic assets such as technologies, brand names and distribution channels (Buckley et al., 
2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rugman and Li, 2007) via mergers and acquisitions (Cui and Jiang, 
2010). Profit maximization may not be the primary objective associated with Chinese OFDI in 
the short-run (Kang and Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012). Instead, Chinese 
investors have actively set up R&D centres in Europe in order to upgrade knowledge-intensive 
product manufacturing in China (Bonaglia, Goldstein, and Mathews, 2007; Minin, Zhang, and 
Gammeltoft, 2012). In summary, Chinese firms investing overseas display “unconventional” 
patterns of internationalization (Mathews, 2002; Sanfilippo, 2015).
1 According to Han (2019) the leading industries for China's outward FDI stock in billions of U.S. dollars in 
Europe by the end of 2017 were as follows: Manufacturing 34.13, Mining 22.5, Financial services 17.72, Leasing 
and business services 10.63 and Wholesale and retail trade 5.17. 




As the literature on the effect of strengthening IP institutions on OFDI appears to be maturing, 
there are currently only a few studies that investigate the role of the IP institution on OFDI 
originating from China. As discussed earlier, OFDI from China has different characteristics 
compared to Western countries. Given the low level of strength of the enforcement-related 
aspects of the IP institution in China (Boisot, 2004; Papageorgiadis et al., 2014), it is important 
to investigate whether or not Chinese OFDI is affected by the IP institutional environment of 
foreign countries in a similar way as OFDI from developed countries. In so doing, we explore 
A number of empirical studies on the motivations of Chinese outward investors highlight 
the institutional effects relating to each O-L-I dimension. Chinese firms gain ownership-
specific advantages from home institutions if they are state-owned (Sun, Peng, Ren, and Yan, 
2012; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, and Boateng, 2012), network with government institutions (Yiu, 
Lau, and Bruton, 2007) or stay with business groups for government supports (Pangarkar and 
Wu, 2012). Institutions also affect their location choices in foreign markets. Often Chinese 
outward investors tend to select locations with high cultural proximity (e.g., Buckley et al., 
2007; Shieh and Wu, 2012). Furthermore, institutions affect how Chinese firms gain 
internalization-specific advantages via the selection of a governance structure such as the 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures (Cui and Jiang, 2009) and mergers and acquisitions 
(e.g., Rui and Yip, 2008; Sun et al., 2012; Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers, 2011).
However, there are currently very few studies investigating the effect of the strength of IP 
institutions of host countries on Chinese OFDI. A limited number of studies discussed the 
effects of the home IP institution as a supporting pillar of Chinese OFDI (e.g., Boisot, 2004; 
Nolan, 2001; Rui and Yip, 2008). Focusing on the effect of the home IP institution at the sub-
national level, Wei et al. (2014) examined the impact on enhancing China’s OFDI and found a 
positive effect. 




the extent to which the strength of IP institutions impacts Chinese OFDI into the European 
economies which enforce regulations to varying degrees of strength. 
3. Data and Methodology
We formulate and estimate a model for a sample of 21 European economies over the period 
2003-2015. The main objective of this study is to gauge the impact of the strength of the IP 
institutions on Chinese OFDI given the diverse economic and IP strength characteristics of the 
European countries in the sample. Also, the study aims at establishing the significance of other 
potential determinants of OFDI in line with the related literature. Table 1 in the appendix 
presents the European countries in our sample that were selected based on available data. It is 
noted that all 21 countries in our dataset are WTO members and boast relatively strong IP 
regulations.  
3.1 Methodological Framework
The usual linear regression model considers the relationship between a group of explanatory 
variables, X, and a response variable, y, based on the conditional mean function E(y|X). 
Accordingly, this model provides a rather narrow measure of the relationship, based on just 
one moment of the (conditional) distribution of y. However, it should be valuable to assess the 
relationship between y and X at different points in this conditional distribution, as answers to 
important questions are in modeling the tails of the conditional distribution, in other words, the 
devil is in the detail. In view of the latter, we have opted for panel quantile regression (QR) 
which provides a way of measuring the regression relationship at several points of the 
conditional distribution of y simultaneously. Based on the absolute values of the regression 




residuals, QR is more robust to sample outliers and the non-normality of the error terms than 
is the OLS regression. The resulting estimator exhibits desirable asymptotic (large-n) 
properties, and unlike OLS the regression results are invariant to monotonic transformations of 
y.  Quantile regression traces its origins to the seminal paper by Koenker and Bassett (1978), 
but its roots lie deeper than that. In particular, the essential ideas can be traced back to very 
early contributions by Boscovich, Laplace, Gauss, and Edgeworth, as early as the mid-18th 
Century. 
Overall, QR is more robust to non-normal errors and outliers; it permits a richer 
characterization of the data by allowing us to consider the impact of a covariate on the entire 
distribution of y, not merely its conditional mean. The regression model for quantile level τ of 
the response is given by: 
                            (1)𝑄𝜏(𝑦𝑖) = 𝛽0(𝜏) +  𝛽1(𝜏)𝑥𝑖1 +... + 𝛽𝑝(𝜏)𝑥𝑖𝑝 ,  𝑖 = 1,…,𝑛
and the ’s are estimated by solving the least squares minimization problem:𝛽𝑗
                               (2)min𝛽0(𝜏), …,𝛽𝑝(𝜏) ∑𝑝𝑖 = 1𝜌𝜏(𝑦𝑖―  𝛽0(𝜏) ―  ∑𝑝𝑗 = 1𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗(𝜏)) 
where . Then, for each quantile level , the 𝜌𝜏(𝑟) =  𝜏max (𝑟,0) + (1 ― 𝜏)|max ( ― 𝑟,0) 𝜏
solution to the minimization problem yields a distinct set of regression coefficients. In this 
context, the empirical specification of the OFDI regressions is a variant of the standard 
specifications encountered in the literature (see Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012; 
Ramasamy and Yeung 2010). The estimated equation is expressed as follows: 
                 (3)𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1{ 𝐼𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2{ 𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑1𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡




where OFDIit is the logarithm of Chinese outward FDI flows to selected European economies 
(see Table 1) and Xit  is a vector of variables that are thought to significantly condition OFDI; 
i.e. GDPPC is the logarithm of GDP per capita of the respective countries; POP denotes the  
logarithm of population; TRADE is a measure of trade openness; ULC denotes unit labour costs 
– an alternative measure that was also used was LBPROD denoting labour productivity - ; IPE 
is the level of IP strength proxied by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) whereas IPRI is an alternative 
measure capturing International Property Rights index and εt is the disturbance term. The 
squared terms - IPESQ and IPRISQ - of both IP indices have also been incorporated in our 
modeling effort to account for non-linearities. The definitions of variables used as well as the 
descriptive statistics and the cross-correlation matrix are provided in Tables 2 to 4 respectively, 
in the appendix. 
3.2 The Variables
The dependent variable is the stock of Chinese outward FDI (OFDI). The key independent 
variable is the strength of European IP institutions proxied by a recently developed version of 
the Index for Patent Enforcement (IPE) developed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) which measures 
the strength of IP institutions. IPE follows the theoretical underpinnings of transactions cost 
theory and estimates the level of transactions cost that IP-owning firms face when engaging 
with a national patent system. A country’s score is the aggregate of three transaction-cost 
constructs, namely: a) servicing costs, b) property right protection costs and c) monitoring 
costs2. High scores in the index indicate an efficient and effective IP institution where the 
2 The servicing costs construct accounts for the efficiency of the administration process by public and private 
agencies. The property rights protection costs construct measures the costs that originate from the effectiveness 
of the judiciary system. The monitoring cost construct measures the costs that firms experience when they engage 
with the enforcement agencies of a country (Papageorgiades et al., 2019). 




regulative, normative and cognitive structures are aligned, and IP-owning firms experience few 
transaction costs when interacting with the institution. The monitoring cost construct measures 
the costs that firms experience when they engage with the enforcement agencies of a country. 
The  property  rights  protection  costs  construct  measures  the  costs  that  originate  from  the 
effectiveness of the judiciary system. The servicing costs construct accounts for the efficiency 
of the administration process by public and private agencies. In the European context where all 
21 countries in our dataset are WTO members and boast relatively strong IP regulations, high 
scores  in  the  index  indicate  an  efficient  and  effective  IP  institution  where  the  regulative, 
normative and cognitive structures are aligned and IP-owning firms experience few transaction 
costs when interacting with the institution. Lower scores suggest that while the regulative 
structure of the institution is strong, the normative and cognitive structures are not aligned and 
therefore  IP-owning  firms  are  faced  with  an  inefficient  and  ineffective  IP  institutional 
framework and therefore find it difficult to enforce their rights. 
For robustness and comparative reasons, we also utilize an alternative measure - the 
International Property Rights Index (IPRI) - which is based on three main elements: a) legal 
and political environment; b) physical property rights; c) intellectual property rights.3 
Regarding the selection of the other control variables, we incorporate in our model a host of 
variables that have been inter alia identified as main determinants of outward FDI by previous 
research studies. These are GDP per capita, population, trade and unit labour costs (for a more 
comprehensive review see Chakrabarti (2001) and Blonigen (2005)). GDP per capita captures 
the market potential of an economy whilst the population is a proxy for the market size of the 
respective countries4. Existing evidence suggests that market potential and market size are 
3 For more details see  https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/about
4 The impact of the market size on OFDI is proxied by the size of the population rather than GDP because 
according to Chakrabarti (2001) the absolute GDP is a poor indicator. 




positively related to FDI inflows since economic growth acts as a catalyst for the efficient 
utilization of resources and the exploitation of economies of scale via FDI (Chakrabarti 2001; 
UNCTAD 1998). Evidence suggests that large and growing markets are particularly targeted 
by Chinese multinational enterprises (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Kang and 
Jiang 2012). We have also included the trade variable in our model as the more extrovert and 
hence the more “open” a country is to foreign capital, the more likely is to attract FDI 
(Chakrabarti 2001). Trade openness is therefore expected to be positively related to Chinese 
OFDI. 
Unit labour costs have also been used as a potential determinant as the existing empirical 
evidence relating to their impact on OFDI is inconclusive. For instance, in a study that consists 
of selected Central and Eastern European Countries over the period 1995-2003, Bellak et al. 
(2008) find that higher unit labour costs affect FDI negatively, whereas higher labour 
productivity impacts positively on FDI. In general, we should expect that increasing unit labour 
cost will reduce competitiveness - productivity, thus, shaping a less attractive environment for 
FDI. Dreger et al. (2017) however state that higher labour costs do not affect the involvement 
of Chinese investors in existing firms; as China possesses competitive advantages with regards 
to low wages and qualified labour, lower costs are not the main driver for FDI in developed 
countries. In addition, Nicolas (2014) argues that China’s direct investment in the European 
Union tends to be concentrated in non labour-intensive sectors. 
4. Results and Discussion
We estimate five different models - each corresponding to different points at the conditional 
distribution - to test the effect of the strength of European IP institutions on Chinese OFDI in 
different clusters of the countries in the sample of countries. Table 1 presents the results from 
the panel quantile regressions using IPE of Papageorgiades et al. (2014). 




Notwithstanding,  the  negative  sign  in  IPE  may  also  imply  that  the  lower  the  strength  of 
European IP institutions the higher the Chinese OFDI received. This result is consistent with 
the conventional expectation that firms prefer to invest in institutionally similar countries (Xu 
and  Shenkar  2002).  In  this  context,  European  countries  boasting  a  moderate  level  of  IP 
institutional strength may convey mixed signals to Chinese investments. Chinese firms may 
prefer the predictability of a weak IP institution in terms of lack of IP enforcement which, at 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The results suggest a negative and significant relationship between Chinese OFDI and strong 
levels of IP institutions in the median and upper quantiles of our dataset. In these quantiles, that 
consist of the median to high-OFDI recipient countries, the strength of IP rights negatively 
affects Chinese FDI, other factors remaining constant. While this effect was not studied in the 
context of Chinese OFDI before, the negative effect of strong IP institutions in attracting OFDI 
is not consistent with the majority of existing studies on OFDI from developed economies 
(Branstetter et al. 2007; Lee and Mansfield 1996; Ushijima 2013). These studies suggest that a 
potentially positive effect could be attributed to the eagerness of Chinese firms to access 
strategic assets (Rui and Yip 2008) and upgrade their competitiveness at a global level (Deng 
2007; Hong and Sun 2006; Deng 2013). A key aspect in the upgrading process is to escape 
from the poor IP institutional framework existing in China (Boisot and Meyer 2008) and 
develop an understanding and compliance with strong IP institutions that are boasted by most 
developed economies. This is because even if many of the Chinese firms are market leaders in 
China (Clegg and Voss 2011), the lack of a developed IP framework (Boisot 2004), local 
protectionism (Nolan 2001), and imbalanced institutional development in their home market 
(Boisot and Meyer 2008) can impose high institutional costs on Chinese firms when competing 
in strong IP institutions. 
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5 The context of their analysis is somewhat different as the nonlinear effect was significant in the case where a 
sample of former eastern-bloc countries was considered. 
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As far as the non-linear effects are concerned, the positive and significant square term implies 
convexity, i.e. there is a lower IP strength limit before OFDI starts increasing again. More 
specifically, the U-shaped relationship between the strength of IP institutions and Chinese 
OFDI is in line with Papageorgiades et al. (2019)5.  It can, therefore, be argued that Chinese 
firms may be attracted to weaker IP institutions because they share institutional similarities 
with the host countries.  In this context, Buckley et al. (2007) and Yiu et al. (2007) have 
suggested that countries transitioning from centrally planned to market economies develop 
It should be stressed that the generated evidence in this study provides the first empirical 
investigation in the literature on the importance of the strength of IP institutions for OFDI from 
an emerging market by looking at several points of the conditional distribution of OFDI.  The 
findings are not in line with the evidence produced by studies on OFDI from both developed 
and developing countries which suggest that that strong IP institutions act as a gravitational 
point for higher levels of OFDI (Nicholson, 2007; Seyoum, 2006; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004, 
Papageorgiades et al., 2019). Furthermore, it appears that strong IP institutions might deter 
Chinese IP-owning firms to engage in innovation activities in the host country.  The latter is to 
an extent counter to what is expected as countries with strong IP institutions, supportive to the 
IP regulatory structure. 
the very least, poses a limited risk to a Chinese firm’s business model (established at home) 
from the potential enforcement actions by competitors. In contrast, European IP institutions 
boasting a moderate level of strength may be unpredictable for Chinese firms which would 
prefer to avoid entering potentially lengthy and costly IP enforcement efforts when defending 
their IP assets or when being sued for the infringement of the IP of third parties. 




business  and  institutional  ties  with  similar  economies  so  as  to  control  the  institutional 
environment.  In  this  sense,  weaker  IP  institutional  strength  provides  an  opportunity  for  a 
Chinese  firm  to  develop  ties  with  institutional  agents  so  as  to  reduce  the  potential  IP 
enforcement impact by competitors. 
The majority of the control variables included in the estimation have a positive and significant 
effect on Chinese OFDI. More specifically, population and GDP per capita are found to have 
a significant positive effect on Chinese OFDI which is in line with the theoretical expectations 
(see Chakrabarti, 2001). In addition, market openness reflected by trade bears the expected 
positive sign (Ahmad et al, 2018) and is found to have a significant effect on Chinese OFDI.  
A stark observation that derives from our results is the positive and highly significant effect of 
ULC on Chinese outward FDI. Similarly, when we estimate the model with labor productivity6  
instead of ULC, we find a negative and significant relationship with OFDI across all, except 
the 0.75, quantiles. Overall, it appears that both variables - high labor productivity and unit 
labor costs – covey mixed signals to prospective Chinese investors.   
To  test  the  robustness  of  the  results  obtained  using  IPE  we  have  also  used  an  alternative 
measure of patent enforcement, namely the International Property Rights Index (IPRI) which 
scores the underlining institutions of a strong property rights regime: the legal and political 
environment, physical property rights, and intellectual property rights. Table 2 presents the 
quantile regression results obtained through the use of IPRI. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Broadly in line with the results obtained using the IPE index, it appears that the IPRI index 
becomes significant only in the upper quantiles of 0.75 and 0.9 supporting the view that 
6 We have opted to use labour productivity as an alternative measure of unit labour costs for robustness check, 
given the inconclusiveness in the empirical studies. These results, not presented here are available upon request. 




institutional  strength  in  terms  of  patent  enforcing  may  discourage  Chinese  investment  in 
Europe. Such a finding may imply that European countries pose a sophisticated legal apparatus 
while the legislation of the EU adds still another layer of complexity (Corre, 2018). On one 
hand, Chinese investors who wish to invest in an open Europe would need to understand and 
accept its system that comes with increased costs whilst on the other hand, European policy-
makers  should  follow  a  common  and  consistent  approach  and  coordinate  the  investment 
monitoring and filtering processes for the benefit of their citizens. 
In contrast to the IPE results in Table 1, the effect of GDP per capita in the case of IPRI 
remains insignificant across all quantiles. However, all other variables, i.e TRADE, POP and 
ULC maintain a solid positive effect across all quantiles which in the case of TRADE and 
ULC diminishes in the upper quantile (0.9) suggesting that other factors may be in play when 
it comes to sizeable investments in European countries.    
Figure 1 in the appendix displays the process graphs of both IPE - IPESQ, and IPRI - IPRISQ 
for different quantiles, along with a 95% confidence interval. Furthermore, in Table 5 in the 
appendix, we provide the tests for the equality of the slope coefficients across quantiles and the 
symmetric quantiles test. In both cases (IPE and IPRI), the X2 -statistic values of 57.56 and 
43.12 are statistically significant at conventional test levels as shown by the respective p-values 
in Table 5, suggesting that the slope coefficients are constant across quantiles. Also, the 
symmetric quantiles test which performs the Newey and Powell (1987) test of conditional 
symmetry produces X2 -statistic values of 19.50 and 1.34, respectively, sugge ting there is little 
evidence of departures from symmetry. 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications




The strength of international IP institutions and their effect on OFDI has received significant 
scholarly attention over the last two decades. Most studies focus on identifying the effect of IP 
institutions on OFDI from advanced economies, such as the US, Germany, and Japan. The 
existing  empirical  literature  confirms  the  theoretical  expectations  in  that  high  institutional 
differences between the home and the host countries negatively affect OFDI. However, this is 
the first empirical study that explores the effect of the strength of IP institutions on the OFDI 
from an emerging economy point of view at several points of the conditional distribution of 
OFDI. 
Given that Chinese firms operate in a weak IP institutional environment in their home country, 
the  findings  are  in  line  with  conventional  expectations  that  high  institutional  differences 
between  countries  negatively  affect  OFDI.  This  result  also  implies  that  Chinese  investors 
appear to avoid locating in countries offering moderate levels of IP strength, possibly due to 
the unpredictability of the institutional costs that Chinese firms may face when operating in 
such markets. Overall, the results support the view that IP strengthening may not be supportive 
for Chinese investment in Europe while GDP per capita, population, trade openness and unit 
labour costs exert a positive effect on Chinese OFDI. 
The  novel  evidence  of  this  study  has  potentially  important  policy  implications  for  both 
businesses and policymakers respectively as it suggests that the strengthening of national IP 
institutions might discourage OFDI from China. So far, the importance of the IP institution as 
a means of attracting Chinese OFDI has received little currency due to lack of relevant studies. 
In view of the new evidence in the respective literature, it is imperative that EU policy-makers 
Using two measures of IP institutions’ strength we find a negative and most likely non-linear 
effect of European IP institutions on Chinese OFDI which becomes stronger in the median and 
upper-quantiles of recipient European countries. 




redirect their effort to comprehending the inherent challenges that Chinese firms face when 
interacting with European IP institutions. In this context, different levels of IP strength appear 
to be significantly conditioning Chinese OFDI. The evidence suggests that Chinese companies 
are  rather  reluctant  to  advance  capital  outflows  in  countries  with  strong  or  moderate  IP 
institutions. Overall, given that this is the first study exploring the effects of two different 
measure of IP institution on OFDI from an emerging economy, future studies could investigate 
if the effects are similar for the OFDI stemming from other emerging economies as well as 
identify the effects of the worldwide strengthening IP institutions on Chinese investments. 
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Table 1 Panel Quantile Regression Results (IPE - Papageorgiadis et al., 2014). 
Quantile: 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Constant -54.5185 *** -63.2644 *** -47.6196 *** -35.5917 *** -36.6997 ***
(10.8028) (7.9405) (5.7934) (5.2725) (7.2788)
IPE -2.6578 -1.5590 -1.7651 * -1.6112 ** -2.3763 *
(1.8629) (1.5922) (1.0247) (0.7365) (1.4056)
IPESQ 0.1963 0.1101 0.1337 * 0.1163 ** 0.1698 *
(0.1341) (0.1146) (0.0727) (0.0553) (0.1017)
LGDPPC 1.4281 * 1.3891 * 0.6381 * 1.0321 ** 1.2567 **
(0.7413) (0.7600) (0.3527) (0.4587) (0.6025)
LPOP 2.5296 *** 2.4579 *** 2.0406 *** 1.6474 *** 1.6758 ***
(0.2697) (0.2395) (0.1752) (0.1973) (0.2743)
TRADE 0.0194 ** 0.0305 *** 0.0274 *** 0.0190 *** 0.0168 ***
(0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0048)
ULC 0.0580 ** 0.1365 *** 0.1425 *** 0.0633 *** 0.0851 ***
(0.0366) (0.0522) (0.0424) (0.0204) (0.0296)
Pseudo R-squared 0.3988 0.3839 0.3461 0.3141 0.3062
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
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Table 2 Panel Quantile Regression Results (IPRI – Property Rights Alliance) 
Quantile: 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Constant -41.0712 *** -32.9453 *** -32.1837 *** -25.7049 *** -12.2739
(7.5219) (6.4557) (5.6713) (6.7890) (8.3452)
IPRI -0.5708 -1.2474 -0.9213 -1.8384 ** -1.5350 *
(0.8572) (0.9563) (1.1390) (0.7644) (0.8527)
IPRISQ 0.0662 0.1302 * 0.1039 0.1658 ** 0.1674 **
(0.0737) (0.0733) (0.0872) (0.0742) (0.0682)
LGDPPC -0.2729 -0.2112 0.1025 0.4993 -0.0448
(0.3825) (0.3827) (0.4143) (0.5213) (0.6123)
LPOP 2.4600 *** 2.0159 *** 1.7889 *** 1.5077 *** 1.0189 ***
(0.2434) (0.2395) (0.1996) (0.2110) (0.2881)
TRADE 0.0352 *** 0.0291 *** 0.0238 *** 0.0167 *** 0.0043
(0.0054) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0056)
ULC 0.0376 *** 0.0509 *** 0.0514 *** 0.0412 *** 0.0463 *
(0.0094) (0.0107) (0.0149) (0.0106) (0.0270)
Pseudo R-squared 0.3988 0.4446 0.3816 0.3535 0.3173
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 




Table 1. List of Countries
a/a Country OECD member EU member 
1 Austria OECD EU
2 Belgium OECD EU
3 Czech Republic OECD EU
4 Denmark OECD EU
5 Finland OECD EU
6 France OECD EU
7 Germany OECD EU
8 Greece OECD EU
9 Hungary OECD EU
10 Ireland OECD EU
11 Italy OECD EU
12 Netherlands OECD EU
13 Norway OECD Non-EU
14 Poland OECD EU
15 Portugal OECD EU 
16 Romania Non-OECD EU
17 Russia Non-OECD Non-EU
18 Slovakia OECD EU
19 Spain OECD EU
20 Sweden OECD EU
21 Switzerland OECD Non-EU




Table 3. Descriptive statistics
LOFDI IPE IPRI LGDPPC LPOP TRADE LBPROD LBPROD ULC
 Mean  4.0787  7.0306  6.9293  10.3393  16.5397  96.4472  1.4667  1.4667  97.1744
 Median  4.5362  7.3703  7.2090  10.5996  16.1682  83.1433  1.1821  1.1821  98.1215
 Maximum  9.9068  9.7000  8.7850  11.4251  18.7898  216.2428  22.4948  22.4948  162.3868
 Minimum -3.2189  3.2469  3.2000  8.6953  15.2009  45.6091 -4.6557 -4.6557  43.5686
 Std. Dev.  2.7074  1.8238  1.3177  0.6659  1.01853  40.1956  2.6096  2.6096  11.4373
 Skewness -0.4981 -0.3051 -0.6427 -0.5426  0.72156  0.8014  2.3981  2.3981  0.56306
 Kurtosis  2.9779  1.8345  2.6979  2.2613  2.27747  2.5976  19.2406  19.2406  12.4552
 Jarque-Bera  11.0459  19.6853  13.5846  19.6012  29.6277  31.0645  3106.561  3106.561  974.6894
 Probability  0.0039  0.0001  0.0011  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
 Observations  267  273  187  273  273  273  260  260  258
Note: The letter L before a variable’s name denotes a logarithmic transformation.
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Table 4. Cross-correlations table
 FDIS IPE IPRI GDPPC POP TRADE LBPROD ULC
OFDI 1.0000 -0.0422 -0.0114 0.0362 0.4090 -0.1318 0.0212 0.4474
IPE -0.0422 1.0000 0.9292 0.8067 -0.4633 0.1222 -0.1032 -0.1483
IPRI -0.0114 0.9292 1.0000 0.8081 -0.5010 0.1809 -0.1205 -0.0388
GDPPC 0.0362 0.8067 0.8081 1.0000 -0.3561 0.0100 -0.1094 -0.0450
POP 0.4090 -0.4633 -0.5010 -0.3561 1.0000 -0.5054 0.0408 0.3265
TRADE -0.1318 0.1222 0.1809 0.0100 -0.5054 1.0000 0.2679 -0.0341
LBPROD 0.0212 -0.1032 -0.1205 -0.1094 0.0408 0.2679 1.0000 -0.0936
ULC 0.4474 -0.1483 -0.0388 -0.0450 0.3265 -0.0341 -0.0936 1.0000
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Table 5. Quantile tests
Test IPE model IPRI model 
a. Quantile Slope Equality Test (Wald test) 57.56(0.000) 43.12(0.009)
b. Symmetric Quantiles Test (Wald test)  19.50(0.147) 1.34(0.987)
  The p-values of the Wald test-statistics in parentheses.
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Figure 1. IPE and IPESQ Plots
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Figure 2. IPRI and IPRISQ Plots 
    




Table 2. List of Variables.
Variable Definition Source
OFDI Outward Foreign Direct Investment, stock 
(constant US$)
Ministry of Commerce, People’s 
Republic of China.




IPRI International Property Rights Index Property Rights Alliance. 
http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org
POP Population, total United Nations, World Indicators 
GDPPC Gross Domestic Product per capita (constant 
US$) 
OECD 
TRADE Trade in goods and services (% of GDP) OECD
ULC Unit Labour Costs, Cost of labour per unit 
of output produced (%) 
OECD
LBPROD Labour Productivity, Labour 
productivity/Labour utilization, annual 
growth rate (%)
OECD 
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